

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00242 01 OF 05 192351Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 TRSE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 /078 W
-----088105 200001Z /70

O 191815Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MBFR VIENNA 00242

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 19 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING OF THE FOURTEENTH ROUND ON
APRIL 19, FRG REP (BEHREND) AND SOVIET REP (TARASOV)
DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENTS. THE FRG PRESENTATION IS
REPORTED BY SEPTEL. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS STATEMENT,
TARASOV REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE.
AFTER STATING THAT ANY WESTERN MOVE BASED ON THE OLD CONCEPTS
OF "DISPARITIES" AND "ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS" WOULD BE
OF DOUBTFUL UTILITY, SOVIET REP SAID THAT EASTERN
PARTICIPANTS WOULD STUDY THE INITIATIVE THOROUGHLY
AND INDICATED THAT THEIR STUDY WOULD BE PARTICULARLY GUIDED
BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE INITIATIVE MET THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00242 01 OF 05 192351Z

CRITERIA OF MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS AND EQUIVALENT
CONTRIBUTIONS TO REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
EARLIER IN HIS STATEMENT, TARASOV USED SHARP WORDS TO
DEFEND THE EASTERN CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS ALREADY
AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE FORCES OF EAST AND
WEST IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND TO ATTACK AT LENGTH
WESTERN CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY. SOVIET REP

ALSO STRONGLY CRITICIZED WESTERN MANPOWER INCREASES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING A SHORT NEGATIVE REFERENCE TO THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THE ERW DECISION, DENIED ANY MANPOWER INCREASES ON THE EASTERN SIDE AND CAUSTICALLY BLAMED THE WEST FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE FULL RUSSIAN TEXT OF TARASOV'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN

1. IN THE ANNALS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WE WRITE TODAY THE END OF THE 14TH ROUND. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN ON THE PATH FOR A LONG TIME, THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS PRACTICALLY NOT BEGUN. IN ADDITION, THE DIMINISHING OF THE UNPRECEDENTED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS MILITARY POTENTIALS IN THIS REGION IS BECOMING EVEN MORE URGENT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF GENERAL PEACE.

2. THE PRINCIPLE LINE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AT THE VIENNA TALKS DIRECTED TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS GOAL, IS A PART OF THE GENERAL EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, OF OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL DETENTE AND THE ADDITION TO IT OF MILITARY DETENTE, FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00242 01 OF 05 192351Z

PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PROPOSALS, IT WOULD ALREADY FOR A LONG TIME HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO START TO WORK OUT IMMEDIATELY AN AGREEMENT ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, THE UNCONSTRUCTIVE POSITION OF THE WEST DID NOT GIVE THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION.

3. IN CONSIDERING THE RESULTS OF THE 14TH ROUND, IT IS POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, TO NOTE SEVERAL POSITIVE MOMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCUSSION OF NUMERICAL DATA, CONNECTED WITH THE REALISATION OF THE COMPROMISE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES OF 25 OCTOBER 1977. HOWEVER WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO EXAGGERATE EITHER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL DATA, NOR THE USE OF THE DISCUSSION OF FIGURES ITSELF, SINCE EVERYTHING WHICH HAS BEEN DONE IN THIS DIRECTION HAS STILL NOT BROUGHT US NEARER TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MAIN GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE BASIC CAUSE FOR THIS IS TO BE FOUND IN THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL OF THE LEADING COUNTRIES OF NATO THERE HAS CLEARLY NOT BEEN A SERIOUS INTEREST IN SEARCHING FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROCESS OF DETENTE CONTINUES IN A DEFINED DIRECTION IN WORLD AFFAIRS, IN THE POLICY OF THESE

COUNTRIES THE INCONSISTENCY IN THE APPROACH TO THE DEEPENING OF THIS PROCESS IS OVERLOOKED, THE ATTEMPT TO BRING FORWARD AS A KEYSTONE THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ARMS RACE, TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE WEST IN A ONE-SIDED WAY IS INCREASING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IS REALISING A SERIES OF FAR-REACHING PROGRAMMES IN ACCUMULATING CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND IS PREPARING TO SATURATE ITS ARMED FORCES WITH NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE DANGEROUS PLANS FOR THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00242 02 OF 05 192144Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 TRSE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 /078 W
-----086219 200004Z /70

O 191815Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2815
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0242

IN THIS AREA OF NEUTRON BOMBS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY LAID ASIDE;
THEIR REALISATION HAS ONLY TEMPORARILY BEEN POSTPONED.
IT IS NATURAL THAT IN SUCH CONDITIONS THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT HAVE CHANGED FOR
THE BETTER.

5. THE ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS SOMEHOW TO JUSTIFY
THEIR OWN ACTIVITIES BY REFERENCES TO A SO-CALLED INCREASE OF THE
MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT HAS NO
FOUNDATION. AS HAS MORE THAN ONCE BEEN POINTED OUT BY THE RESPON-
SIBLE LEADERS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION
NOR OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT DURING THE TIME OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS HAVE INCREASED AND NOR ARE INCREASING THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.
THE IMPROVEMENT BY THEM OF THEIR ARMAMENTS DOES NOT GO BEYOND
THE FRAMEWORK OF NORMAL REPLACEMENT OF OLD WEAPONS BY MORE

CONTEMPORARY ONES. AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, L I BREZHNEV,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00242 02 OF 05 192144Z

DECLARED ON MARCH 31 OF THIS YEAR "THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER ARMED ITSELF FOR THE SAKE OF ARMAMENTS, HAS NEVER AND NEVER WILL BE THE INSTIGATOR OF THE ARMS RACE. OUR SUCCESSES IN THE MILITARY FIELD, THESE ARE SUCCESSES DIRECTED TO DEFEND AND PRESERVE OURSELVES AND OUR SOCIALIST FRIENDS FROM ANY POSSIBLE AGGRESSION, FROM WHERE-EVER IT MIGHT COME."

6. THE ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN THE ARMS RACE, NOT TO SEEK TO VIOLATE THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IS, IN PARTICULAR, TO BE FOUND IN THE WELL-KNOWN PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR THE NON-INCREASE BY THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MANY OTHER OF OUR INITIATIVES FOLLOW RIGHT ALONG THIS LINE. THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE OF THESE IS THE INTRODUCTION BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE OF A DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF PRODUCTION, STOCK-PILING, DEPLOYMENT AND USE OF NUCLEAR NEUTRON WEAPONS. THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE WEST POSITIVELY TO CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS UNDERLINES THAT, IN THE NATO COUNTRIES, THE CALCULATION FOR CHANGING IN THEIR FAVOUR AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE MILITARY FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS STILL TAKING PRECEDENCE OVER THE IDEA OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

7. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, DISPLAYING THEIR CONTINUED READINESS TO SEARCH FOR REALLY JUST SOLUTIONS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY OF ANYONE, AT THE SAME TIME ARE NOT WILLING TO MAKE UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. IT IS EMPTY AND FUTILE FOR THE WEST TO EXPECT SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER REDUCTIONS FROM THEM THAN THEY ARE PREPARED THEMSELVES TO MAKE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00242 02 OF 05 192144Z

8. AS FAR AS THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS IS CONCERNED, L I BREZHNEV IN HIS RECENT SPEECH ON BOARD THE CRUISER 'ADMIRAL SENYAVIN' DECLARED "WE DECISIVELY REJECT ANY ATTEMPTS TO THRUST UPON US UNJUST CONDITIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT. WE HAVE SAID AND WE SAY AGAIN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS FOR THE MOST RAPID ACHIEVEMENT OF AN

AGREEMENT, BUT ONLY FOR SUCH AS WOULD BE FOUNDED ON THE BASIS OF STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH WOULD INCARNATE THIS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE. WE DO NOT DEMAND THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD GIVE ANY KIND OF AN ADVANTAGE TO THE OTHER SIDE BUT FROM IT WE ARE EXPECTING AN EXACTLY SIMILAR APPROACH. THERE CAN BE NO OTHER SOLUTION."

9. THESE WORDS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, OF THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET STATE, ARE FULLY APPLICABLE ALSO TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. ANY COUNTRY IF IT DOES NOT WISH TO LOSE TOUCH COMPLETELY FROM THE REAL POSSIBILITIES AND GIVE ITSELF UP ENTIRELY TO MOTIVES OF SELF-INTEREST MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN VIENNA ONLY SUCH AN AGREEMENT AS WOULD PROVIDE AN EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION BY ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCRETE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF EACH OF THEM CAN BE REACHED. ANY DEVIATION FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTION, CAN ONLY LEAD TO A BLIND ALLEY, TO THE CANCELLATION OF THE RESULTS OF A LABOUR OF MANY YEARS, WHICH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE ATTEMPTS OF CERTAIN WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES DURING THIS ROUND TO SHOOT AT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS, EVEN TO CAST DOUBT ON ITS VERY EXISTENCE CAN ONLY BE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS NO SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE WEST FOR A SUCCESSFUL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00242 03 OF 05 192211Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 TRSE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 /078 W
-----086786 200005Z /70

O 191815Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2816
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0242

OUTCOME.

10. TO JUSTIFY A DEPARTURE FROM THIS PRINCIPLE IS INADMISSIBLE EVEN WITH THE HELP OF THOSE ARGUMENTS USED BY THE WEST THAT THERE WAS NO UNANIMITY OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS TO THE EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING SITUATION CONCERNING SECURITY IN EUROPE. HOW COULD ONE OR THE OTHER SIDE EVALUATE A DEMAND THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE ALMOST THREE TIMES AS MANY FORCES AS THE WEST, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE POSITION IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE EAST. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DENY THIS. TO HIDE THIS DEMAND WITH A HACKNEYED FAMILIAR PHRASE THAT THE WEST DEMANDS OF THE EAST THE SAME OBLIGATIONS THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ASSUME ITSELF IS NAIVE AND NOT SERIOUS. EVEN SUCH A JOURNAL AS 'VORWARTS', WHICH IS FAR FROM BEING OBJECTIVE IN TERMS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS PUBLISHED IN THE FRG, WROTE ON MARCH 30 OF THIS YEAR THAT "NATO DEMANDS FROM THE EASTERN SIDE MORE SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS THAN THE WEST IS PREPARED TO TAKE ITSELF".

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00242 03 OF 05 192211Z

11. WE DO NOT HAVE A REALLY UNIFIED UNDERSTANDING WITH THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN EACH STATEMENT BY OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES WE HEAR ASSERTIONS

CONCERNING THE "SUPERIORITY" OR THE "CONSIDERABLE SUPERIORITY" OR EVEN THE "MAJOR SUPERIORITY" OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY GROUND FORCES, OVER THE WEST, AS IF THIS HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS. BUT EVEN IF THIS DID HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE MATTER IN HAND, THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH SUCH ASSERTIONS ARE REPEATED STILL WOULD NOT MAKE THEM MORE CONVINCING. THEIR CORRECTNESS HAS TO BE PROVED AND IF IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE THEM THEN IN THE WORSE CASE SOME SERIOUS BASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR THEM. HOW DO OUR OPPONENTS COPE WITH THIS TASK? VERY SIMPLY. THE ASSERTIONS CONCERNING THE SUPERIORITY OF THE EAST ARE SUPPORTED BY ASSERTIONS CONCERNING THE "EXISTENCE OF DISPARITIES" AND "PROVED" ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY FLOW FROM WESTERN ASSESSMENTS. TO OUR MANY AND FULLY LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS ON WHAT IS THE CORRECTNESS OF THESE ASSESSMENTS BASED, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES LIMIT THEMSELVES MERELY TO THE STATEMENT THAT "WESTERN ASSESSMENTS ARE ACCURATE AND CORRECT AND REFLECT THE FACTUAL SITUATION." THE SO-CALLED "PROFF" CONSISTS OF NOTHING MORE THAN THIS. SO IT WAS WITH THE STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DE VOS ON 16 FEBRUARY THIS YEAR AND AMBASSADOR BEHREND ON 16 MARCH AND IN THE STATEMENTS OF OTHER WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES.

12. THE ABSENCE OF ANY FACTUAL BASES FOR THE ASSERTIONS CONCERNING "DISPARITIES" OBLIGES THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO RESORT TO ANOTHER EQUALLY LIGHTWEIGHT DEVICE NAMELY TO ATTEMPT TO PLACE A UNILATERAL

INTERPRETATION UPON PARTICULAR STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MADE BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF 1976. ON THE BASIS OF THIS SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION THE WEST WANTS TO PRESENT THE ISSUE AS IF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THEMSELVES FORMERLY RECOGNISED THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00242 03 OF 05 192211Z

"SUPERIORITY OF THE EAST" IN GROND FORCES AND "DID NOT SERIOUSLY DISPUTE" THE WESTERN ESTIMATES.

13. WE STATE WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY THAT SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS ABSOLUTELY GROUNDLESS. WITH CONVINCING EXAMPLES, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES REPEATEDLY, INCLUDING AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF 9 MARCH THIS YEAR, DEMONSTRATED THAT THEIR DELEGATIONS HAD NEVER RECOGNISED THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF "DISPARITIES", AND THAT THEY HAD DESCRIBED THIS CONCEPT AS ARTIFICIAL, FAR FETCHED AND DISTORTING THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. AS REGARDS THE WESTERN ASSESSMENTS WE HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THEM ARBITRARY, INFLATED AND INCORRECT AND WE HAVE ALWAYS DECLARED THIS OPENLY. ALTHOUGH ONE OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES RECENTLY DECLARED THAT OUR ELUCIDATIONS "WERE NOT CONVINCING AND WERE IN CONTRADICTION WITH NUMEROUS FACTUAL MATERIALS", IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT DISPROVE THESE ELUCIDATIONS NOR REFER TO ANY FACTS WHATSOEVER. CONSEQUENTLY THE WESTERN INTERPRETATION REGARDING THE EARLIER POSITION OF THE EAST HAS ALSO TURNED OUT TO BE BUILT ON SAND.

14. NOW WHAT DO THE FIGURES WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED BY THE SIDES INDICATE? EVIDENTLY THE OFFICIAL FIGURES, BEING THE MOST EXACT AND AUTHORITATIVE CRITERION, CANNOT BE REPLACED BY ANYTHING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THESE OFFICIAL FIGURES OBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRATE THAT HERE IN FACT EXISTS APPROXIMATE EQUALITY. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE OFFICIAL FIGURES ARE NOT THE APPROPRIATE CRITERIA AND THAT WE SHOULD BE GUIDED NOT BY THEM BUT BY THE WESTERN ASSESSMENTS. BUT WHY PARTICULARLY WESTERN ASSESSMENTS? EVIDENTLY ONLY BECAUSE IT IS THEN SIMPLER FOR THE WEST TO INSIST ON THE EXISTENCE OF "DISPARITIES" AND TO BRING FORWARD ITS OWN PEREMPTORY DEMANDS FOR "ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS". BUT ALL THIS, MR CHAIRMAN CANNOT BECOME THE BASIS FOR IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS.

15. IF SOME PEOPLE IN THE WEST, AS THEY SAY, FOR THE "HONOUR OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00242 04 OF 05 192052Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 TRSE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 /078 W
-----085854 200006Z /70

O 191815Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2817
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0242

UNIFORM" WANT SOMEHOW OR OTHER TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLES AND PARLIAMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF THE CORRECTNESS AND ACCURACY OF THEIR OWN ASSESSMENTS THEN IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE WHY OUR OFFICIAL DATA ARE NECESSARY AT ALL. IF THE WEST IS SINCERELY STRIVING TO FIND THE MISTAKES AND INACCURACIES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THEIR CALCULATIONS THEY HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME SINCE 1976 TO MAKE SUCH CORRECTIONS. THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL, MORE DETAILED OFFICIAL DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES AS WELL AS AIR FORCES WHICH TOOK PLACE IN MARCH AND APRIL OF THIS YEAR SHOULD, IN THE OPINION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, GIVE A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO OUR WESTERN PARTNERS TO CONVINCE THEMSELVES, AT LAST, THAT THE FACTUAL SITUATION HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE EXISTENCE OF "DISPARITIES" AND SHOULD ONCE AGAIN HELP THEM TO DISCOVER THE REASONS FOR THE INCORRECTNESS OF THEIR ASSESSMENTS. IF, HOWEVER THE WESTERN SIDE ALSO THIS TIME FAILS TO USE THESE OPPORTUNITIES TO REVIEW ITS GROUNDLESS POSITION ON "ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS", THE CONTINUATION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION COULD LOSE ANY PURPOSE WHATSOEVER. WE DO NOT SEE ANY NECESSITY OR ANY ADVANTAGE IN DECLARING EVER NEWER AND NEWER FIGURES AND IN EXCHANGING DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00242 04 OF 05 192052Z

DESIGNATED INDIVIDUAL FORMATIONS AS THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSED TO US EARLIER. WE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN AN EXAMINATION OF THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF FORCES, THE NAMING OF THE DESIGNATIONS AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF PARTICULAR UNITS AND FORMATIONS AND THEIR FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENT IN ABSTRACT FROM THE TASKS OF THE REDUCTION. THIS IS A QUESTION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND NOT ONE FOR GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE INTERESTS AND EFFORTS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE BROUGHT BACK ONTO THE COURSE OF ACHIEVING UNDERSTANDING

ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES BECAUSE THIS IS THE IMPORTANT THING.

16. IN THIS CONNECTION, MR CHAIRMAN, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE WEST HAS NOT FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS INTRODUCED ANY NEW PROPOSALS ON THE BASIC QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS LAST PROPOSALS OF 16 DECEMBER 1975, AS ITS INITIAL PROPOSALS, WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE SIDES. THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN ESSENCE DECLINE FROM ENTERING INTO A BUSINESS-LIKE DISCUSSION OF THE COUNTER PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF 19 FEBRUARY 1976 WHICH CONTAIN A SERIES OF IMPORTANT STEPS TOWARDS THE POSITIONS OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS AND WHICH ENVISAGE A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE PRESERVING THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF FORCES IN THIS REGION. THIS TACTIC HAS UNNECESSARILY DRAWN OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS DISTORTED THEM INTO AN INFERTILE COURSE.

17. IT IS OF COURSE NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF NEW STEPS BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THEY SHOULD LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF THE ESSENTIAL DIVERGENCES AND NOT REMAIN ON THE COURSE OF UNBRIDGEABLE DIFFERENCES. IN OUR VIEW ANY INITIATIVES, FROM WHICHEVER SIDE THEY MIGHT COME, MUST NOT PASS BY THE PRINCIPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00242 04 OF 05 192052Z

OF THE MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS OR IGNORE THE EQUIVALENCE OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH STATE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THEIR DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC SHOULD BE AN EQUAL APPROACH TOWARDS ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS REGARDS THE VOLUME AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00242 05 OF 05 192101Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 TRSE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 /078 W
-----085964 200008Z /70
O 191815Z APR 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2818
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0242

METHODS OF THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES AND THE EXISTENCE OF EQUAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE REDUCTION. THE VALUE OF STEPS WHICH BASE THEMSELVES ON THE OLD CONCEPTS OF "DISPARITIES" AND "ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS" WOULD BE RATHER DOUBTFUL. AFTER MORE THAN FOUR YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER A DETAILED COMPARISON OF THE POSITIONS AND AFTER THE MOST THOROUGH ANALYSIS HAS FAILED TO RESULT IN ANY PROVEN REJECTION OF THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE TIME HAS COME WHEN, ACCORDING TO OUR CONVICTION THE WEST SHOULD DEMONSTRATE A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO SOLVING THE TASK WHICH STANDS BEFORE US.

18. NOW, ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THERE HAVE APPEARED CHANGES IN THE EXISTING WESTERN PROPOSALS. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WILL STUDY THIS WESTERN INITIATIVE IN THE MOST THOROUGH MANNER. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT SUCH STUDY WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS INITIATIVE FACILITATES THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WORKING OUT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IN ASSESSING THIS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00242 05 OF 05 192101Z

INITIATIVE WE WILL, IN PARTICULAR, APPLY THOSE SAME CRITERIA TO WHICH WE HAVE REFERRED IN THE PRESENT STATEMENT.

19. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE DECLARED AND WE DECLARE AGAIN THAT ANY STEP BY THE WEST WHICH IS REALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE AND JUST SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE NOT GIVING ANY PARTY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES NOR DIMINSHING THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY WILL MEET WITH UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.
ENDYEXT. RESOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, AGREEMENTS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS, PRESS CONFERENCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00242
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780168-0366
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780440/aaaabhw.x.tel
Line Count: 541
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 5b888bab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2920673
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 19 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING OF THE FOURTEENTH ROUND ON APRIL 19, FRG REP (BEHREND) AND SOVIET REP (TARAS)
TAGS: PARM, GE, UR, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/5b888bab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014